Declaration of Independence Evaluation Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Declaration of Independence Evaluation - Essay Example Declaration of independence was not entirely congress original work in terms of convictions and ideas. It has several similarities with the work of John Locke work about the American treatise. The beginning clauses of the document that states that human kind was created alike with inalienable rights of liberty, life and freedom is in conjunction with the Locke philosophy. Locke point of view was that all the jurisdiction and power is equal with no citizen having more than the other does. The document further proceeds to emphasize that government is established through the decision of the citizens to protect their rights. Furthermore, it claims that in case the state does not address and protect the rights of the people then it will be the democracy of the citizens to abolish or alter the government. The Locke’s philosophy is well enshrined in the document. Hobbes counter declaration mimics the ideologies of declaration of independence and the Hobbes ideas was to justify the ki ng's action in England as perfectly legitimate. Hobbes perception and beliefs allowed the people to elect sovereign once and after that, the people should be obedient to the government without questioning. The sovereign as called by Hobbes decides the successor and the rules. The perspective was seen the United States founding fathers that this method will leave the government vulnerable to corruption. With the idea they opted to apply Locke’s’ philosophy. Hobbes document saw the need for the people to abolish any political bond that is connecting them and take the power sovereign land. He further expounded that opinion of the humankind necessity declaring the cause that forces the people to dissolve. His ideologies were evident that humanity are created alike and endowed with life by the creator and securing the rights the governments were to be formed among the few. Hobessian perspective on the declaration of independence could have stated that if any type of leaders hip cannot protect the people then the rights of the citizens to dissolve it could have been necessary. As the government could protect the citizens then the people must respect and obey the said government. His perspective also was of the view that the said government had the obligation of assenting to bills even if it was not the opinion of the people. The government is endowed with rights that are suitable as far as it will not disable its ability to protect the people. Hobbes argued that equality and freedom in respect to individual rights meant that individuals could pursue their interest and survival without limitation in the state of nature. The government is without duty to respect the rights of the individuals. The state of nature herein is the state of war hence Locke has claimed the people have the duty to respect the individual’s rights even in the state of nature source of the duty being the natural law. There is also a difference to the Hobbes perception in that Locke argued differently about the property. They both agree that individuals have rights to any property in the state of nature. They also differed in that Hobbes denies the individual duty of the citizen to respect the property of others. In this perspective, the property is made less or useless in a state of nature according to Hobbes. On the other side, Locke is of the opinion that individuals

Miami International Airport Research Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Miami International Airport - Research Paper Example The airport is used by both passengers and cargo. The Miami-Dade Aviation Department operates the airport. Miami International Airport is the property of Miami-Dade county government. It is one of the busiest airports in the world and was founded in 1928. Miami International Airport is located on three thousand two hundred and thirty acres of land near downtown Miami. Its terminal is being expanded to more than seven million square feet through a capital improvement program which is scheduled for final completion in early 2014 (Peter, 2009). The high number of passengers and cargo that go through the airport tend to have political, social and economic impact. This is because of the trade between different countries and the exchange of ideas and work force between different countries. Like many airports around the world, there are social amenities at the airport that contribute to the economy an example being the Miami International Airport Hotel. Apart from being a place where tourists and other passengers can check in for a rest, it highly contributes to the economy of the country and also helps in maintaining the airports standard (Didion, 1998). The economic impact is not only in the amount of revenue generated but also in the number of jobs created. Miami International Airport and the General Aviation Airports have an annual economic impact of thirty two point eight billion U.S dollars. The airport and other related aviation industries contribute a total of two hundred and seventy two thousand three hundred and ninety five jobs directly and indirectly to the local economy. This means that the airport creates one out of every four jobs. The activities that go on daily at the airport have contributed to its economic impact (Peter, 2009). Among U.S Airports, it is ranked the first in international freight, second in international passengers, third in total freight, third in

Why Radical Right Parties Struggle to Maintain Support

Why Radical Right Parties Struggle to Maintain Support Explaining the rapid decline in support for radical right parties in Western Europe Abstract The general trend amongst the radical right parties of Western Europe has been a steady increase of fortunes in elections to the national legislature. However, cases in France, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands have presented a phenomenon whereby the party haemorrhages their share of the vote soon after an electoral breakthrough. The aim of this work will be to highlight why (where it occurs) parties of the extreme right have struggled to maintain the consistent support of a large portion of the electorate and explain why this decline is more rapid than traditional mainstream parties. Introduction Background Amongst observers of Western European parties of the radical, or extreme, right there has been a general consensus that the last three decades have exhibited a trend of resurgent fortunes. Since the collapse in support and legitimacy for such parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War, they initially struggled to establish an electoral foothold in both the traditionally and newly democratic systems of Western Europe. Approaching the 21st Century, though, most countries in Western Europe witnessed an upturn in fortunes for the radical right, with many achieving the status of mass organised parties and becoming a persistent presence in national legislatures. Consequently, academic literature has tended to focus on the reasons behind this phenomenon, observers attempting to provide explanations behind the electoral performance of specific parties or an over-arching explanation of why radical right parties appear to be becoming increasingly p opular and successful in elections to national legislatures. This has provided several factors which are generally considered to be conducive towards the success of the radical right, such as: populist appeal; charismatic leadership; shifting debate in the political spectrum which creates a niche which the radical right alone can exploit; increasing salience of radical right issues; notably immigration and race relations; decline in voter confidence in the traditional democratic elites (including electoral effects of voter apathy); and increasing perception of mainstream party corruption; and inability to deliver on critical issues; and more. Taking the general theme of research in this area, then, one might assume that the fortunes of Western European radical right parties has on the whole been of increasing, or at least stable, electoral fortunes. Indeed, in researching for this paper, it has been noted that electoral results for radical right parties to national legislatures has in almost all Western European countries been improving over the last three decades. However, there are certain cases which present an interesting question regarding the futures of such parties and the continuance of this trend. This is the question of whether they are institutionally capable and stable enough to maintain support and legitimacy, as well as operate as a successful governing party once they have achieved significant success. Such success we might define as the institutionalisation of the party as a relatively permanent feature in national elections, with reasonable potential to participate in coalition negotiations or be a signif icant factor affecting the passing of bills and focus of debate in the national legislature and media. As mentioned, for many parties this is already a reality, or could realistically become one, but four cases suggest that once extreme right parties have reached a certain level of support, they encounter the same risks as many other institutionalised parties with regard to reversals in fortune. However, I will argue that many of the risks they face are unique to parties of the radical/extreme right, and hence why in the cases under study the decline in support has been so rapid. The cases under question regard when parties of the radical right experience a reversal of the general electoral trend, namely a decline in support. As mentioned, examples of this have been the exception rather than the rule, but are of significant interest because of the fact that radical right parties are still essentially niche parties. The cases investigated in this paper Austrias FPO, Frances Front National, Germanys Die Republikaner, and the Dutch parties of the radical right have all at some point experienced a significant downturn in electoral support in national elections. In 2002, the FPO slipped from 26.9% of the popular vote to just 10% after a tumultuous period in coalition with the OVP, and though experiencing a resurgence in fortunes, the party has suffered from Haiders split to form the BZO. In Germany, the Republikaner party went from being a party with European Parliament and Landtag seats and polling over half a million votes in federal elections by 1998, to a sp lintered and no longer apparently extremist party which has almost dropped off the electoral map in federal elections. The French Front National has been an ever-present and outspoken feature of French politics since Jean-Marie Le Pen burst onto the scene, but after the unexpected success in the 2002 presidential elections, they have been unable to maintain momentum, with numerous internal spats and a slide a results in 2007 Le Pens lowest result in presidential elections since 1981, and the National Assembly results more than halving. Finally, the Netherlands presents an interesting case, whereby several radical right parties have scored seats in general elections, yet so far all have swiftly collapsed, despite what might be argued is a fertile ground for the radical right as a force in Dutch politics. These cases stand out because of the unusually damaging decline in electoral fortunes, which buck the trend of established radical right party performance over the last three decades. Whilst there are examples of established radical right parties (i.e.: parties which have representation in the national legislature over several terms) which have suffered electoral setbacks (notably the Alleanza Nazionale in 2001, Norways Fremskrittspartiet in 1993), such declines in support have been relatively minor, and such parties have recovered from them swiftly. This paper seeks to provide some explanation as to why the reversal in electoral fortunes for the four parties under investigation here has been so rapid. Whilst there have been cases elsewhere in Western Europe of radical right parties suffering electoral setbacks, none have been so markedly significant as these, where the parties under examination have experienced declines in performance of at least 60% in elections to the national leg islature in the space of just two elections. In two cases the LPF and Republikaner this has been near a near terminal decline; in the case of the FPO, this was followed by a significant split from which they are only just recovering; and the FN are left at in a difficult position, particularly given the age of their ever-present leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. These results stand in stark contrast to the general story of radical right success in recent decades, where a decline in votes for an established party has been both relatively minor and recoverable from, the four parties under investigation have experienced what appear to be electoral nose-dives. Consequently an examination of the reasons why these four parties have suffered such unusually damaging results might help to produce interesting results concerning how the parties of the radical right operate as an electoral force and any unique challenges they face in consolidating themselves in the party systems of Western Europe. Previous research in this area As mentioned earlier, general research into the declining fortunes of the radical right has been relatively sparse and overwhelmed in comparison to the amount of research conducted into the reasons behind success for the radical right. Much of the general work into the radical right as a new phenomenon has provided useful grounds for research into decline, most notably Herbert Kitschelts The Radical Right in Western Europe (University of Michigan Press, 1995), which posited that the radical rights success in the late 20th century can to a large extent be explained by an electoral systems effect on voter choice. This seminal work has gone some way to explaining the differing levels of success exhibited by the radical right, offering a plausible reason why there appear to be significant limits to radical right success at a national level in mixed and majoritarian systems, such as the UK, Germany and Scandinavia, compared to systems which are more proportional or have lower thresholds for entry into legislatures. It is useful to take into account the effect of electoral systems, given that many individual and general studies suggest that successful radical right parties will often exhibit very similar traits with rega rd to leadership style, policy platforms and party organisation, and in particular the mobilisation of electoral coalitions on common policy issues; yet these similarities stand in contrast to electoral results which might vary greatly. Though Kitschelts theory as elucidated in The Radical Right is intended primarily to explain the conditions for radical right emergence and success, it has also been to some extent used to explain the converse why the radical right might experience a decline in success. However, the great weakness of Kitschelts study is that it is so concerned with explaining conditions for emergence. Numerous studies have gone to show that taking the converse of Kitschelts theory that electoral systems can explain reversals in success for radical right parties will not provide satisfactory explanations of the radical right phenomenon. Partly this is because the electoral systems model cannot account for reversals in success once a radical right party has become established. Indeed, if we take Kitschelts theory strictly, we might conclude that once a radical right party has established itself as a legitimate and vote-winning parliamentary party (i.e.: it has broken through the electoral thresholds and maintained representation for at least one subsequent election), then it is unlikely to fall back into a position whereby it retreats into permanent decline despite a permeable electoral system. Significant counter-examples to this notion exist, most notably the Dutch example, whereby the radical right has broken through electoral barriers to make relatively significant gains, only to suffer rapid and terminal decline, despite little change to the electoral system and the obvious salience of radical right politics amongst a stubborn group of extremist voters and significant group of protest voters. The issue is further complicated when we consider the effect of other actors in the electoral system. Two studies in 2005 (Veugelers and Magnan; Meguid) complimented an approach which showed how flawed an analysis of electoral systems can be when considering the reasons for a decline or restriction in the success for radical right parties. The Veugelers Magnan study sought to apply Kitschelts electoral systems theory, although the study was specifically aimed at analysing the conditions for far right strength. The significance here was that the study A.) suggested that the conditions for far right success were dependent to a significant extent upon the structure or restructuring of party competition; and B.) that an application of the electoral systems theory could not satisfactorily explain the (varying levels of) success for parties in France and Austria. Whilst Meguids studypaid little attention to electoral system features as a variable, it did present strong evidence that the a ttitudes of ‘mainstream parties towards niche (including radical right parties) is crucial to the electoral fortunes of a niche party at a general election a theory backed up by Art, who believed the differing levels of success experienced by the German and Austrian extreme right was primarily attributable to mainstream responses to their presence in the arty system. The structure of party competition is therefore of interest, as it provides the possibility of a significant external factor which might effect a decline in support for a radical right party. Individual studies have shown the significance of mainstream responses to radical right issues when it comes to electoral performance. Generally, there is a lot of divergence across countries with regard to cross-party adoption of and attitudes towards the policies and issues canvassed by the radical right. This is partly due to the nature of political discourse in each country, with what we might call ‘radical right grievances amongst voters and politicians alike rather diverse. Whilst the primary issues championed by the radical right tend to be common (foremost amongst which are immigration, race relations and anti-establishment platforms), the salience of these issues amongst voters varies significantly from country to country, and accommodation of such issues likewise. For instance, m ainstream responses to immigration and race issues in Germany are rather muted by mainstream fears of being accused of auslà ¤nderfeindlichkeit, despite it being a highly vocal issue at local level in contrast, there has been a marked shift in strategy amongst the French mainstream since the early 1990s to accommodate issues popularised by Le Pens outspoken rhetoric. Again, much of the general work on party system effects on the fortunes of the radical right has centred upon their emergence and the conditions for success, rather than failure. A general theme popularised by Ignazi (1992) was that the evolution of political discourse in post-industrial Western Europe to focus on neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism had opened up and legitimised dialogue concerning issues traditionally confined to the extreme right. Given that these same themes are to some extent still prevalent today, it might be suggested that any decline in fortunes for the radical right might be due to internal factors affecting radical right parties, rather than the result of further shifts in the political spectrum which havent been evidenced. However, Ignazis theory has become less popular recently, with studies such as Abedi (2002) suggesting that radical right parties are just as successful where ‘overcrowding of the centre is evident as when the centre parties open up (as Ignazi suggested) to allow possible entry. Further to this, no obvious correlation between a fall in support for the radical right and a change in the party system can be drawn. This is partly due to difficulties in producing a coherent model of the party system which analyses such a correlation, as well as because responses to the influence of a radical right party tend to be driven by particular or extraordinary events in the short term, rather than medium- and long-term shifts in discourse. Particularly evident are the cases of the LPF and FPO, whereby shifts to actually accommodate these parties in government by pragmatic coalition partners were immediately followed by a rapid decline in support, even though the overall terms of political debate did not significantly change over the period in question. This might lead us to agree with Abedi that any change in support for the radical right is largely unrelated to the degree of polarisation exhibited by the party system. We m ight subsequently take the view that a decline in support for a radical right party has an ambiguous relationship to restructuring of the party system. Given this we might look to the manner in which parties of the radical right garner support in the first place (excepting any influence from external actors such as those discussed above). Studies in this area have again tended to concern how the radical right achieves support in the first place. A recent example is Ivarsflatens (2008) study, which supports the theory that the only grievance mobilised by all radical right parties with any success is that of immigration. Importantly, this study suggests that radical right parties are just as effective when no particular grievance is mobilised (intentionally or not). This presents one of the more crucial issues that the radical right faces, namely how to deal with a voter base which tends to be split along three lines first, committed voters who are attracted to the partys general platform; second, voters who would normally vote otherwise, but are attracted because the issues touted by the party (in particular, immigration) suddenly b ecome more salient; and thirdly a protest vote from those voters who have become particularly disillusioned with mainstream parties(more on this later). The suggestion, consequently, is that it is not a change in policy or grievance issues which effects a drop in support for the radical right, but rather a partys response to changing perceptions of legitimacy and reliability as a legislative grouping. This is particularly important given that radical right parties so often emphasise themselves as anti-establishment, meaning they risk de-legitimisation if they acquire the labels of ‘corrupt and ‘ineffective which they hurl at mainstream parties. Having to contend with these issues, radical right parties have consequently developed rather unique party structures in order to respond effectively to voter issues. Of particular interest is common assertion that the radical right tend to be populist parties. For numerous reasons too extensive to list here, radical right parties have relied heavily on new media and the appeal of a charismatic and outspoken leadership. Due to their small size relative to mainstream parties, as well as the more transitory nature of their voter base, they have tended to rely heavily on alarmist campaigning, often gaining press coverage in excess of their size or real influence, in order to get heard and maximise their effect on party dialogue. This is a regularly observed strategy, even if it weakens or threatens solidarity and effectiveness in the party leadership. One key objective of such a technique is to widen and enhance their voter appeal, but in order to work successfully radical right parties have often had to ‘water downproposals, or at least simplify them in order to fulfil the need for soundbites and slick campaign material. Such campaigning, and a reliance on uniquely charismatic and authoritarian leadership (a common feature across the most successful radical right parties), is a factor common to most radical right parties, particularly those under study in this paper. Hypotheses Given the variety of factors affecting the establishment and growth of the radical right, it might be reasoned that there are numerous reasons behind the failings of radical right parties where they have occurred. Although external factors such as party system structure, electoral system and the nature of the electorate have been shown to have an effect on the performance of radical right parties, existing research suggests that this is most significant when a radical right party is emerging. However, I will seek to show that whilst these factors can be part of the reason for a decline in support for radical right parties, they are not necessarily primary causes. In particular, in the four cases under investigation, the hypothesis is that the external factors mentioned are not significant enough to explain why the decline in support for these parties was so rapid. The central question of this paper is why the radical right in the four countries under investigation have experienced such a substantial decline in voter share between elections, rather than a minimal drop or continuing to grow as has been the case with the radical right in other West European countries. A hypothesis based on external factors (party system and competition, media strategy, electoral system, voter issues, etc.) affecting the party is unlikely to be sufficient, as the variation in circumstances for the four parties under consideration means it would be difficult to derive a general cause for electoral demise, particularly given the highly unorthodox nature of the parties decline in comparison to the overall story of radical right success across Europe in the same period. A hypothesis based on internal factors (leadership, party strategy, etc.) alone is also insufficient, as it is difficult to envisage how the decline in votes scored on such a large scale can be the res ult of internal structural issues without a significant alteration in the external factors precipitating a decline. Comparing these cases to other Western European radical right parties which have not suffered a significant or permanent collapse in support, it is suggested that the successful parties have better managed a transition which allows them to present themselves as reliable governing parties which can (sustainably) fulfil the demands of voters in parliament or government, rather than just reliable vote-winning ­ parties which can win representation on limited issues at individual elections. The former is shown to be present in the case of parties such as Italys MSI/AN and Lega Nord, Switzerlands SVP, Norways Fremskrittspartiet, etc, all of which have avoided significant declines in vote-share despite changing conditions in the party system or electoral system. It is therefore expected that in the four cases under investigation the three most significant factors conducive to the plunge in electoral results are:- 1.) Leadership style. As mentioned, radical right parties tend to, without the ‘taming effect of coalition partners, be characterised by a populist style of campaigning, often focusing on specific political issues to fan voter sentiments and gain cross-cleavage support from the electorate. This often includes leaders who embody a highly pragmatic and charismatic leadership style. It is hypothesised that in our four cases this style of leadership makes it difficult for the party to the demands of government or maintain a stable coalition of support. 2.) Mainstream party responses to the radical right. Since the emergence of the ‘new radical right party family there has been a general move by radical right leaders towards legitimising their parties within political systems, and it is not controversial to suggest that this is a necessity for them to be perceived as legitimate by an electorate in order to break into a national legislature or into government, or by the parties they have to negotiate with in parliaments (for the passage of bills, formation of coalitions, etc.) in order to effectively influence policy. It is postulated that the reaction of mainstream parties to a breakthrough by the four parties under consideration inhibits the respective radical right partys ability to operate as a governing/policy influencing party, as well as inhibiting the ability of the initially large electoral coalition which gave them representation to support them in a consequent election. 3.) The social bases of electoral support. Given the heterogeneous nature of support for radical right parties at the polls, it is suggested that a significant portion of the vote for the parties under consideration at ‘breakthrough elections is mobilised on a temporary, rather than a permanent, basis. This could be for a variety of reasons issue salience, identification as a ‘radical right voter, legitimacy of the party. It is suggested, therefore, that the four parties under investigation have been unable to establish a stable and reliable basis of electoral support between parliaments, such that when factors (1) and or (2) come into play the party suffers from the departure of one or more groups of voters that are attracted to the party by temporary issues. Consequently the steep decline in vote share is a result of the inability of the party to consolidate their appeal to a broad enough group of voters to maintain their electoral momentum, resulting in only a small g roup of faithful voters turning out to prop up their poll numbers. Methods and Focus This paper will focus on the developments of four parties in the electoral periods relevant to the subject of enquiry. These are: the French Front National between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, and the 1997, 2002 and 2007 National Assembly elections; Austrias Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) between the 1999 and 2002 Parlament elections; Germanys Die Republikaner between the 1998 and 2002 Bundestag elections; and the cases of the Dutch radical right parties, concentrating on the electoral fortunes of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn between the 2002 and 2003 elections to the House of Representatives. In each of these cases the parties in question have gone from positions of relative strength to haemorrhaging votes, results which stand in contrast to results for radical right parties elsewhere across Western Europe. This paper will then focus on analysing whether the hypotheses listed above are true. This has been done by assessing academic papers which have analysed the conditions of the relevant parties in order to determine what, if any, consensus there is on the reasons behind these parties collapse in vote share, backing this up with media evidence where it is relevant. Additional to this, general research into the systematic effects determining what might cause a drop in votes for the radical right has been called upon in order to confirm the hypotheses, as well as potentially extrapolate the hypothesised causes for vote decline from external factors (such as changes in the party or electoral system, the strategies of rival parties, changes in issue salience, etc) in order to see if it can be confirmed. Throughout the investigation special attention will be given to several key themes which contribute the events surrounding the electoral defeats of the parties in question. These will include:- Party leadership All four parties under investigation have been generally considered by observers as exhibiting a populist style of political strategy. Three factors are worth considering here. First, how far this is important in allowing the party to generate votes at general elections; second, to what extent the party uses populist campaigning to gain influence on policy; and thirdly, how this affects the partys ability to respond to demands of government/the electorate (where relevant). Legitimacy of the party This does not concern whether or not the party is viewed as a legitimate, i.e.: not anti-system, party; rather, it concerns whether or not the party has a reputation for delivering on its promises, or can present candidates who are genuine and reliable enough for an electorate to support them. This is important in the sense that the partys chances of maintaining electoral momentum may be hampered by poor performance in government or in the legislative process in parliament. Competition in the party system How other (relevant) parties in the countrys party system respond to the challenges posed by the party of the radical right. Obviously there is a difficulty in assessing which responses by what parties actually have an affect on the performance of the radical right party. Consequently we will be looking for cases collaboration, cohabitation, or ostracisation by mainstream parties which have an observable effect on either the radical right partys electoral fortunes, or their ability to operate as a policy-influencing party (be it by governing or as a force in the legislature). Salient policy issues at elections Parties of the radical right have been noted to campaign on a breadth of issues, albeit often engaging more vocally with a specific issue in order to generate support, in contrast to mainstream parties (particularly those with ambitions of government) which are forced to campaign on a wide variety of issues affecting all voters. Consequently, it is of interest to observe whether the specific campaign and policy stances of the radical right parties at elections in any way effected (or possibly even mitigated) the decline in vote share. The social bases of support Radical right parties do not fit easily into a cleavage-based model of the party system, as they tend to draw their support from a wide variety of social backgrounds for numerous different reasons. It is of interest, therefore, from what groups did the party under investigation originally garner support in the election preceding the regression, and whether there was any observable change in the type or confidence of the groups who voted for the party by the time of their decline in the following election. Cases Studies Austria the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) The FPO is possibly the most significant party to begin this investigation with, due to the fact that it is not only one of the longest established radical right parties, but also because it occupied government for far longer than any other under investigation here. Since Jà ¶rg Haider was elected leader of the party in 1986 it had experienced a remarkably sustainable rise in results, culminating in the earthquake success at the 1999 election where it became the second largest party with 26.9% of the vote. It is of note that the FPOs success has roughly correlated to the declining fortunes of the ‘Grand Coalition of SPO and OVP. Popular disenchantment with the Proporz system which had characterized Austrias two-party system came to a head in the 1999 elections when both parties opinion poll ratings slumped immediately prior to the election. The SPO/OVP coalition had not, by most standards, been particularly unsuccessful or hit by scandal, even benefitting from increasing opinion poll numbers thanks to Austrias presidency of the EU in the second half of 1998. Whilst the Social Democrats poll numbers remained remarkably stable (with only a minimal drop in 1999 compared to the OVP), the OVP had a much harder time, being unable to mitigate a general trend of decline that had continued since the 1991-95 Parlament. In particular, Mà ¼ller notes that the party had difficulty in producing a coordinated and effective campaign on election issues, compared to the aggressive campaigning of the SPO and FPO, the latter of whom was particularly successful at enlivening their campaign by recruiting celebrities such as Patrick Ortlieb and Theresia Kirler. The constitution of the vote for the FPO in the 1999 election is also interesting with regard to how it broke the OVP/SPO duopoly. The FPO had been remarkably successful at increasing turnout from voters of every background, suggesting the FPO was poaching voters from both the SPO and OVP. This is partly due to voter dissatisfaction with the continuation of the Grand Coalition still too tainted by Proporz, as well as the FPOs ability to play off Haiders recent election to the Governorship of Carinthia a success which greatly enhanced the FPOs credentials as a party of government. However, the core vote for the FPO remained blue collar (predominantly male) workers, largely (and perhaps disproportionately) drawn from former SPO-leaning voters, despite the SPO being generally seen to have been more successful than the OVP at limiting the drop in votes experienced as the 1995-9 coalition came to its end. (Though it should be noted that the FPO increasingly attracted a significant number of voters from right-leaning farmers and middle-class professionals unhappy with the OVPs commitment to the EU and perceived lack of leadership.) The FPO had also more than any other party managed to increase membership of the party, particularly amongst professionals and those exhibiting no ideological affinity for the party. Luther points out that as beneficial as this may have been for maximising turnout, the membership drive was set against a push by Haider to fill organisation posts within the party with individuals likely to be loyal to the party leadership (i.e.: Haider), including key figures such as Susanne Riess-Passer and Karl-Heinz Grasser. T

Free Essays - Catcher in the Rye :: Catcher Rye Essays

J.D Salinger gives his personal vision of the world successfully through his persona Holden Caulfield in the ‘Catcher in the Rye’.   Caulfield struggles with the background of New York to portray Salinger’s theme – you must live the world as it is, not as you would like it to be.   There by exposing Salinger’s vision on the world. Salinger went through many of the experiences Holden went though.   Salinger much like Holden had a sister that he loved very much, in the novel Phoebe is the only person that Holden speaks highly of; both men also spent time in a mental institution; Holden is telling the story from inside a institution; they were both kicked out of prep school and most importantly they were both a recluse from society.   This is why Salinger uses Holden as his persona all though out the book.   The ‘catcher in they Rye’ is almost like an autobiography for Salinger. He is using Holden as his persona to let us, the reader, dive into his thought pattern and find out some of the thoughts that he kept locked up in there. Salinger’s view of the world is lived out thought Holden – his persona. The novel is Holden’s steam of conscience as he is talking to a psychoanalyst â€Å"what would an psychoanalyst do†¦gets you to talk†¦for one thing he’d help you to recognise the patterns of your mind†. At the start of the novel it is addressed directly to us â€Å"if you really want to hear about it†. This gives us a sense of reality as though it is us that is the psychiatrist. We see the random thought patterns of Holden’s mind as he starts to feel more comfortable, Holden goes off on to many different tangents while he is talking. Salinger is using Holden as a type of easy way out to confess his view of the world.   This view is portrayed though two main aspects of the novel.   Firstly theme - you must live in a world as it is, not as you would like it to be.   Holden can’t seem to accept the world as it is and finds New York extremely â€Å"phoney†.   Holden has a great disliking for the movies, he finds them the phoniest of them all â€Å"I hate the movies like poison† and he cant believe that people actually make time to go to the there.

Action Plan for New Nivea in a New Market Segment

The improving economic conditions in various parts of the world provide individual companies with market opportunities that need to be exploited completely. Some Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FCMG) manufacturers have already made this move whereas others are still concentrating on traditional highly developed economies. This paper illustrates how Nivea, the skin care manufacturer, can exploit market opportunities offered by the fast developing nations. The paper will specifically extrapolate on how Nivea can develop a wholly new skin care product that would be marketed to specific market segments in the aforementioned nations. The first section highlights on external audit of the new market and product situation, whereas the second part provides internal audit. An action plan for two months before product launching and 12 months after the launch is illustrated throughout the paper. Part I: External Audit The fast developing nations, especially in Asia, provides FCMG manufacturers with grand opportunity to expand global sales. The past three decades have indeed seen disposable incomes in formerly poor countries s increase tremendously. China and India are the best example of countries whose inhabitants have experienced ever-increasing incomes. Higher incomes mean that Indians and Chinese are able to afford products that seemed to be luxury before. Skin care products fall in such category, meaning that Nivea has a ripe market its product portfolio. The younger generation in both countries is especially the ones that Nivea needs to target. The growing taste of luxurious skin care products demands that Nivea embark on supplying products to this lucrative market segment. In addition, the company has to consider developing new products that are specifically designed for this generation; just supplying products from traditional markets might not make significant impact. This market segment need products they can easily associate with, not just imports. Developing a product specifically for the Asian market would therefore get better reception before competitors think of making a similar move. Customers in this market segment would take a pride in using product specifically developed for their uses, as the company reaps benefits through improved sales and market dominance. Nivea is not the only skin care product manufacturer eying the lucrative Asian market, as other global companies are making onslaught in the region (Haig 2006). A greater number of competitors are also supplying imported products to this market segment, meaning that Nivea would be making the initial move of developing and marketing products for this new market. Nivea competitors in these markets can be classified into three groups. First is the group consisting of local manufacturers that have been in the business for many years. The availability of modern technology has enabled these local players to perfect respective products to international. The perfection of respective products mean that indigenous companies are able of competing effectively and defend their market position. The second group includes international players with experience in other markets. This group is most competitive and indeed the one that Nivea should not ignore. The improving economic situation in the region will continue attracting more competition from existing firms. The third group includes companies willing to enter into the Asian lucrative skin care market. Nivea management should further consider that local and international companies could get into joint ventures that could be hard to out-compete. The company should therefore consider a similar approach. A joint marketing venture with local companies should especially be considered in the two months before the launch. This is in understanding that professionals working on local companies have better understanding on consumers and their needs (Riezebos, Kist & Kootsra 2003). PESTLE Analysis Pestle Analysis is hereby used to illustrate externalities that Nivea will have to handle in the process of introducing new product in the market segment. These are the issues that the company has little control; they factors are discussed below in detail: Political This factor refers to issues that may affect company operations and thus entry of the new products into the new market segment. National or regional politics have recently determined trade issues in various parts of the world, including Asia. Senior management should therefore consider being informed on political policies that may affect future business. China and India have been on the forefront on the process of creating friendly political processes for companies to establish operations (Pelsmacker 2006). Nivea is thus poised to benefit from friendly trade regime from the two countries. The company can even take advantage of improving investment opportunities in the region to produce therein and consequently supply to other countries in the region as well as worldwide. The company will thus be creating a strong foundation for competitiveness against local and international industry players. Economic: This is among the driving factors leading to Nivea’s entry into the Indian and Chinese young adult market segment. Indeed, as described earlier, this segment has been experiencing expanding disposable incomes that can be used to become Nivea customers. Just like in other countries, the expanding middle class in China and India are having influence over rest of society that would like to copy behavior (Kapferer 2004). Endearing Nivea products to the middle class would eventually see rest of population in the two countries becoming consumers. The region holds good fortunes considering that economic progress being experienced currently is poised to continue in coming decades. It is for this reason that Nivea should seize the opportunity of embarking on supplying new products in the Asian sub-market. Social: This factor regards social sensitiveness that the company has to consider, especially before entering the market segments. This should especially be considered in the two months prior to supplying company products in the region. The social issues should further be considered when preparing for advertisements that must not be offending in any way. In addition, the target market should be able to connect with the product socially, which could include packaging and presentation. Having products connecting with people socially, or which tend to promote local culture would go a long way in endearing the new Nivea to target market. Any clash with the local culture and customs could result to the company being out competed by other industrial players. Technological: The technological factor refers to production and production processes used to manufacture products and subsequently supply to consumers. Nivea management should in the two months before rolling out the products ensure putting the technology in place. In addition, Nivea’s senior management should embark on being on the forefront of using modern technologies that would improve productivity. Embarking on taking this route would provide the company with long run high productivity, meaning that only high quality products would be generated from Nivea. Relying on technology for continued quality improvement would result to more endearment with consumers in the region. Management should thus embark on improving technology in order to keep improving. Environmental: The environmental factor is hereby taken to mean issues affecting the industry as a whole. This especially includes the size of competition and the future of the industry. The number of competitors is a key determinant of competitiveness. Few players does not necessarily mean low competition as more companies can enter the industry in later time periods. Industrial effect on environment is also addressed in this factor. Participants have to thus ensure reducing and totally eliminating the effect of operations on the environment, such pollution. Governments in various parts of the world have heavy fines and punishments to companies and individuals whose operations affect environment negatively. Companies have on the other hand embarked on reducing effects on environment as part of their corporate social responsibility (Bruhn 2002), which is something that Nivea should take seriously in China and India. Legislative: This factor applies to government policies that could affect operations relating to production and supply of skin care products in respective jurisdictions. This is a factor that Nivea cannot in any way control. The company should be well prepared to deal with new legislations that could come before and after launching new products in the market. In addition, the responsible managers should embark on developing ways and means of coping with operational changes that could come with new legislations. Overcoming legislative challenges should form the key foundation for success in the market segments, considering positive relationship between the company regulatory authorities and consumers. Part II: Internal Audit This second part highlights internal factors that Nivea can use to create strong foundation for success in the new market segments and its new product line. The company has been in the business of manufacturing and supplying skin care products since 1911 (Nivea 2008). The company has since expanded operations to many parts of the world, but has in most cases supplied products manufactured for older market. Indeed, the current undertaking would be among few occasions that Nivea has embarked on developing new products for new markets. The SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) Analysis below illustrates how the company needs to apply before, during and after launching. Strengths: Nivea’s track record of manufacturing is among the strengths that will make market penetration in the new segment possible. Company products thus command a huge following in historical markets, which could be replicated in the new markets. The strength of going at greater lengths to meet consumer demands is best being applied in the Asian market through new products. This start by designing products that easily meet consumer skin care needs adequately. The second step is the organizational culture of getting customer feedback on all products, whether new or old in respective markets (Flapper 2005; Pecotich 2006). This allows consumers to express their concerns or satisfactions with the products. The target market in India and China would thus get opportunities to inform Nivea representatives on how the new products could be improved. The company can thus embark on improving the products in line with consumer demands and tastes. The long-term result is continued improvement of company products’ competitiveness in the lucrative Asian market. Weaknesses: The entry into wholly new market segment with brand new products serves as the greatest weakness, considering that the company has certainly never had such undertaking in the region. There are few learning opportunities for the involved officials to get lessons. However, notes Keller (2006) Nivea has a history of turning weaknesses into business opportunities that have been exploited to the maximum—this should also happen with introduction on new products in the Asian sub-market, especially in the beginning stages. Opportunities: The improving economic conditions in the fast developing Asian countries provide ripe market for Nivea skincare products. Ever increasing segment of the populations having more funds to spend on company products. Nivea should thus position itself in tapping into this lucrative market. In addition, the company should take advantage of the improving business environment in the region. China and India are increasingly becoming competitive in the international arena, which has resulted to many companies setting operations there. Companies that have taken advantage of reduced operational costs. Nivea, too, should embark on setting foot in the two countries, and subsequently produce for local market and export to other countries. Threats: Competition from local and international firms brings out major threats for Nivea entry into the new company. Local companies have for many years been able to perfect respective products to international standards (Hymes 2007). This has made them formidable competitors in skin care industry. New entrants therefore understand they are up against tough players. Naivea management further needs to consider that international skin care industry participants are also eying the same Asian market, which compounds competitive challenges. Bust as illustrated earlier, Nivea has had a history of outdoing competition on many fronts. Repeating this feat in China and India is thus more likely to happen.

Government Is a Necessary Evil Essay

Authors have debated the role of governments for hundreds of years. Two of these authors, are Thomas Paine and Henry David Thoreau. â€Å"In Common Sense by Thomas Paine, he expresses his opinion on how the government is a â€Å"necessary evil†, and in the 21st century the government still appears to be evil. † Thoreau also expresses his concern with a government in â€Å"Civil Disobedience†. Both of these authors had valid opinions, and if they still were alive today they would be outraged with the U. S. Government. Paine was a hard working man. He participated in many events throughout his life, including fighting in the American Revolution. There was no doubt that Paine was a patriotic man, he simply did not agree with the values and ideas of a government. He had a strong concern for the rights of men, and expressed it clearly through his literary work, Rights of men. Michael Williams states in â€Å"Visionaries and Sceptics: Tom Paine and some Contemporaries†, â€Å"While Paine shares their concerns with the rights of women, his principal focus is on the revolutions he witnessed in America, and later in France, on the deleterious effects of tyrannical government, and on an idealistic vision of the future, once these effects are eliminated. (Williams p. 1). This shows that Paine was not only concerned with the ideas of a government; he was well rounded and cared for many people. He was not a stubborn, grouchy man that did not agree with authority. Paine wanted to fix the problems in the government. Paine was not naive, and he realized that the government will always be around. He was looking for a way to make it better. He knew that without a government there would be no order. Williams also states† The first section of Common Sense is headed as ‘the origin and design of government in general’, and it offers a sustained attack on the principles of monarchy and, in particular, those of the English monarchy. †(Williams p. 6). It does in fact attack on the principles of monarchy, especially the English monarchy. Paine was originally from England and he had a special love for England. He did not want to see the English people being treated unfairly due to the monarchy. Paine thought that king’s were unfit to govern. Paine did not believe that one man should make the ultimate decision on how people choose to live their lives. Although Paine was concerned with England, he was equally concerned with the thirteen colonies. Many historians believe that Common Sense sparked an American Resolution, and during the war Paine always encouraged and inspired patriots with a series of pamphlets entitled The American Crisis. Paine did not want to be a part of the problem; he wanted to be a part of the solution. According to The Norton Anthology of American Literature,† Paine received a number of political appointments as rewards for his services as a writer for the American cause, but too indiscreet and hot tempered for public employment, he misused his privileges and lost the most lucrative offices. †(The Norton Anthology of American Literature p. 325). Paine wanted to make a change in the government and society, but is interpersonal tact prevented him from doing so. Many people lost respect for Paine, because people looked up to him and was hoping he would help make a change. He did make change but not as much as he could have. Paine had a lot of potential and influenced many people. The author of â€Å"Tom Paine: Utopian? †, Mark Jendyrisk states â€Å"Paine lived with a dual vision, one both forward-looking and traditional. †(Jendryisk p. 139). Even though Paine did not agree with the old Puritan ways and their ideas of a government, Paine still had traditional values. His values were not as extreme as the Puritans. Paine had high hopes and goals to fix the â€Å"old fashion† way of thinking and to help change the corrupt world. Jendryisk also stated, â€Å"He believed that republican government could nurture or create a uniform, shared public-interest and citizen self-control. † (Jendryisk p. 139). Paine wanted a republican government where everyone could talk about their opinions without being ridiculed. Paine wanted people to have a say on how the society should have been ran. Paine knew the government was a necessary evil, because without the government the society would not have order. The government is necessary for many reasons, and without it society would be troubled and lost. He also knew that power will eventually make a person corrupt, and that is why there should not be a Monarchy. The Monarchy would mean one man; a king would be over a mass number of people. Paine strived for a more republican government, where more people in the society would have a say. According to Jendryisk,† In all his major works and especially in Common Sense, Rights of Man, and The Age of Reason, he smashes the idols and shibboleths of his time: kingship, established religion, aristocratic hierarchy, and unexamined tradition. † (Jendryisk p. 140). Not only did Paine despise the government’s way, like the set up of kings, he also disliked established religion. Paine was not a religious man, and the Puritans put a â€Å"bad taste in his mouth† when it came to religious ways. A lot of people also had unexamined traditions, traditions that have been around for years and did not make any sense, and people still abided by them. Paine lived by two things, common good and individualism. If the people of his day could have practiced those two things, everything would have went a lot smoother with society. Jendryisk also points out that, â€Å"Paine sees human progress as inevitable, but he recognizes the need for direct action to motivate that progress. † (Jendryisk p. 141). Paine has faith that the government will get better and will change. He knows that change is a good thing, especially in this certain situation. Paine also realizes that the religious extremist will eventually calm down as well. This will help change a lot of different things in the government, such as laws. Many of Paine’s literary works helps contribute to the progress and definitely motivates others. Henry David Thoreau had several of the same values and thoughts about government that Paine had. Cathryn McIntyre, the author of The Politics of Thoreau: A Spiritual Intent, states that†Thoreau’s views are always worth considering when assessing the political landscape of any time, but as I read through his politically inspired essays and lectures I am continually impressed, not by his political views, but by the way his spiritual awareness influenced his political views, and in fact all of his thinking, and it is that spiritual awareness, not his politics, that interests me most. †(McIntyre p. 1). Unlike Paine Thoreau has religious beliefs, and talks about his views often. Thoreau believed that people had a duty to God and themselves before the government. Even though Thoreau did not believe in the old ways and traditions, he still had religious beliefs, so this proves that he was not being a â€Å"rebel†. Thoreau simply did not believe in an organized government. Thoreau wrote Civil Disobedience, and in this he is more resistant than Thomas Paine was. Comparing Paine and Thoreau to two men that were fighting for the same thing but different in many ways when it came to their values would be, Martin Luther King Jr. nd Malcolm X. Paine is more like Martin Luther King Jr. and Thoreau is more like Malcolm X, because of how resistant they both were. Thoreau once refused to pay his taxes, because he was unhappy with the government and the way they were handling the slavery and Mexican-American War situation. He spent the night in jail as his punishment. Carl Bankston III, the author of Thoreau’s Case for Political Disengagement states, â€Å"His refusal to pay the poll Tax does not come from any moral compulsion to right the wrongs of the world, but from the ethical desire to avoid doing wrong himself. (Banston III p. 7). He believed the U. S. was unjust because of slavery; the Declaration of Independence says â€Å"All men are created equal. † McIntyre also states,† Thoreau believed if you confine a man under government rules, tie him to his occupation, and monopolize his time with strictly material pursuits while holding him back from a direct relation with nature or from a direct connection to the divine, you will have a man who is leading a life of quiet desperation. †(McIntyre p. 1). Thoreau is stating that the government cannot control everyone’s life. All of the strict, unnecessary rules will make people miserable. So Thoreau’s simple solution to the government was to not follow the majority and to have your first obligation to yourself and what you believe. He thought people should do what they believe is right and not follow the laws made by the government. Even if this meant breaking the law, he still thought your personal belief came first. He did not believe people should obligate and devote themselves to the evils of the government. In Civil Disobedience, Thoreau states, â€Å"Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. †(Thoreau p. 834). Thoreau is asking the society, do they want to be miserable and wait for things to change or do they want to take a stand and do something about the problem. Thoreau believed that society could make a stand by disobeying the rules, because if you obey the rules nothing will be changed. He knew that society had to let the government know that many people had an issue with the particular law or rule. Thoreau thinks the government rarely proves itself useful and that it derives its power from the majority. This is why Thoreau did not like the majority, he says the majority is the strongest group, and not because they hold the most legitimate viewpoint. Everyone seemed to have the same simple state of mind, and did not want change and to become more â€Å"of the world†. Although Thoreau was against slavery and the war, he really did not have a plan to fix it. According to Bankston III, â€Å"While Thoreau was opposed to slavery and to the Mexican War; he does not provide us with a blueprint for the peaceful and free society that he wanted to see conscience bring into existence. †(Bankston p. 11). Thoreau had many negative things to say about the government and society but did not take charge. Like many people in the 21st century, everyone has a complaint and no one has a solution. This is how Paine and Thoreau differ; Paine had a plan and tried to make the society better in any way. Another literary work by Bankston III, Civil Disobedience, states â€Å"He says that he was born to live in the world, not to make it a better place to live. †(Bankston III p. 1). This proves the theory that Thoreau had no intention to make the government better, and try to get rid of the evil. Much like many people in the 21st century, they complain and dislike the government system but never do anything to change it. Thoreau did not believe in voting or petitioning, he felt it does not make a difference. Many people in the 21st century have the same beliefs as Thoreau. Although Paine had a bad temper and could have excelled more in making the government and society better, he did make many changes and influence a lot of people. Indeed Thoreau had a mentality to not make a change, he still influence many people with his writing. Thoreau had good intention and could have been a great leader. The Government is a necessary evil, it is now and it has always been. Paine and Thoreau eventually lost hope in a change; they realized the government will never change. They accepted the fact that no matter what there will always be a government, and when people receive the power to lead and to make decisions, they turn corrupt.

Learn 10 Facts About Sochi Russia

Learn 10 Facts About Sochi Russia Sochi is a resort city located in the Russian Federal Subject of Krasnodar Krai. It is north of Russias border with Georgia along the Black Sea near the Caucasus Mountains. Greater Sochi stretches 90 miles (145 km) along the sea and is considered one of the longest cities in Europe. The City of Sochi covers a total area of 1,352 square miles (3,502 sq km). Geographic Facts About Sochi The following is a list of the ten most important geographic facts to know about Sochi, Russia: 1) Sochi has a long history that dates back to Ancient Greek and Roman times when the area was inhabited by the Zygii people. From the 6th to the 11th centuries though, Sochi belonged to Georgias kingdoms of Egrisi and Abkhazia. 2) After the 15th century, the region making up Sochi was known as Ubykhia and was controlled by local mountaineer clans. In 1829,  however, the coastline region was ceded to Russia after the Caucasian and Russo-Turkish Wars. 3) In 1838, Russia founded the Fort of Alexandria (which was renamed Navaginsky) at the mouth of the Sochi River. In 1864, the final battle of the Caucasian War took place and on March 25 a new fort Dakhovsky was established where Navaginsky had been. 4) Throughout the early 1900s, Sochi grew as a popular Russian resort city and in 1914, it was granted municipal rights. Sochis popularity grew further during Joseph Stalins control of Russia as Sochi as he had a vacation home, or dacha, built in the city. Since its founding, Sochi has also been the served as the location where various treaties have been signed. 5) As of 2002, Sochi had a population of 334,282 people and a population density of 200 people per square mile (95 per sq km). 6) Sochis topography is varied. The city itself lies along the Black Sea and is at a lower elevation than surrounding areas. However, it is not flat and has clear views of the Caucasus Mountains. 7) The climate of Sochi is considered humid subtropical at its lower elevations and its winter low temperatures rarely dip below freezing for long periods. The average January temperature in Sochi is 43 °F (6 °C). Sochis summers are warm and temperatures range from 77 °F to 82 °F (25 °C-28 °C). Sochis receives about 59 inches (1,500 mm) of precipitation yearly. 8) Sochi is known for its various vegetation types (many of which are palms), parks, monuments and extravagant architecture. Around two million people travel to Greater Sochi during the summer months. 9) In addition to its status as a resort city, Sochi is known for its sports facilities. For example, tennis schools in the city have trained such athletes as Maria Sharapova and Yevgeny Kafelnikov. 10) Due to its popularity among tourists, historic characteristics, sports venues and proximity to the Caucasus Mountains, the International Olympic Committee selected Sochi as the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics on July 4, 2007. Sources: Wikipedia. Sochi. Wikipedia- the Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sochi